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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The concept of tax expenditures has been widely accepted1 and has 
even been adopted into federal law, which requires the annual promul-
gation of tax expenditure budgets.2 Pursuant to that mandate, several 
federal governmental offices publish lists of what they deem to be tax 
expenditures. One such budget is published by the Department of 
Treasury,3 and a different budget is published by the Staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation.4 While there is considerable overlap in those 
two budgets, they are not identical, and they utilize different norms   
and baselines for determining what constitutes a tax expenditure.5          
In addition, forty-five states publish their own versions of a tax           
expenditure budget.6 
 The theme of the tax expenditure concept is that some tax provisions 
are not elements of a normal or ideal system of income taxation and that 
such provisions are designed indirectly to finance a program that Con-
gress has chosen to support.7 The listed tax provisions are designated as 
 * Paul G. Kauper Professor, University of Michigan Law School. The author thanks Jus-
tin Hoag for his assistance in the preparation of this Essay. 
 1. Professor Zelinsky observed in a recent article that the advocates of the tax 
expenditure concept have prevailed and that the federal government and the governments of 
forty-five states  publish tax expenditure budgets. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The 
Counterproductive Nature of Tax Expenditure Budgets, 137 TAX NOTES 1317 (2012). 
 2. 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2012) defines the terms “tax expenditures” and “tax expenditures 
budget.” Section 632(e)(1) requires the Committee on the Budget of both houses of Congress to 
publish a report each fiscal year, and the report must contain a tax expenditure budget. Id. 
§ 632(e)(2)(E). 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (2006) requires the president to submit a budget each 
year, which must include a tax expenditure budget. 
 3. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 241-77 (2013). 
 4. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017 (Joint Comm. Print 2013). 
 5. Id. at 1, 20-22.  
 6. Frank Shafroth, Tax Expenditures: A Most Taxing Challenge, 64 ST. TAX NOTES 327 
(2012). 
 7. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 2 (“Special income tax provisions 
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disguised expenditures of the government that should be subjected to 
the same scrutiny as are direct expenditures.8 While there is considera-
ble overlap in the items listed in the two federal tax expenditure budg-
ets, there are differences because they do not utilize the same baseline. 
The budgets also provide an estimate of the amount of revenue that    
the government loses because of the inclusion in tax law of each such 
designated provision.9 
 There are several questions concerning the premise on which the var-
ious tax expenditure budgets rest. First, is there a “pure” or “ideal” in-
come tax system? Second, even if there is one, was there any intention 
by the legislators to adopt a system that would accord with a pure in-
come tax system? Third, as a matter of policy, would it be desirable to 
adopt a tax system that comports with a pure income tax system? I will 
explore these questions in this Essay. 
 In prior articles, I have expressed my view that the tax expenditure 
concept is flawed and misleading.10 In this Essay, I will set forth a view 
of the structure of the federal income tax system that is different from, 
and in contravention of, the view underlying the tax expenditure con-
cept. I propose an entirely different standard for measuring the appro-
priateness of a tax provision. The tax expenditure concept is based on a 
binary approach in categorizing tax provisions. Under that system, an 
item either is consistent with normal tax provisions or is inconsistent 
with them. There are no shades of consistency. Instead, I propose a mul-
tivariate standard for evaluating tax provisions.  
 Over 32 years ago, I published an article on accelerated depreciation 
in which I concluded that some amount of acceleration was consistent 
with normal tax principles and should not be classified as a tax expendi-
ture.11 Over the intervening years, from time to time, I have exchanged 
comments with authors who have questioned that conclusion.12 It is time 
are referred to as tax expenditures because they may be analogous to direct outlay programs 
and may be considered alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy objectives.”). 
 8. There are reasons to question just how much scrutiny is given to direct expenditures. 
Many governmental programs, such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid dispense large 
amounts of money without any congressional oversight of the programs. See AARON 
WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 213-16 (2d ed. 1974) (explaining that 
members of Congress have increasingly become “negligent guardians” of the purse). 
 9. The two budgets utilize different methodologies in determining the amount of revenue 
that is lost. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 20-22. 
 10. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical 
View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992) (criticizing the tax expenditure concept’s assumption of “[a]n 
ideal Internal Revenue Code”).  
 11. Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation—Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for 
Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
 12. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum, Accelerated Depreciation: A Proper Allowance for Measuring 
Net Income?!!, Comment, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1172 (1980); Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated 
Depreciation Revisited—A Reply to Professor Blum, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1185 (1980). 
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to revisit that topic and renew the consideration of how tax depreciation 
may properly operate.  
 This Essay’s analysis of depreciation provides one example of how the 
tax expenditure budgets are flawed. The treatment of some accelerated 
depreciation as a tax expenditure is based on a view that any accelera-
tion conflicts with normal tax principles.13 I will show in this Essay that 
when the structure of depreciation is examined, it becomes clear that 
there is more than one way to determine what allowance for deprecia-
tion should be made. Furthermore, allowing acceleration does not con-
travene any established tax principles. 
 It is not the thesis of this Essay that acceleration is the only proper 
method of tax depreciation. To the contrary, it is my view that many 
forms of depreciation are proper and comply with normal tax principles, 
and that accelerated depreciation is merely one of the appropriate meth-
ods that can be authorized.  
II.   REPLACEMENT OF THE TAX EXPENDITURE CONCEPT 
 Even those that admire the tax expenditure concept acknowledge 
that there is a problem in identifying many of the items that constitute 
expenditures because there is not universal agreement as to what con-
stitutes a pure income tax system. Such a system is the base against 
which tax provisions are measured to determine whether they are 
“pure” tax provisions or tax expenditures.14 Nevertheless, these com-
mentators note that there are many clear examples of what are and are 
not tax expenditures, so they approve of the concept and regard any 
questionable inclusions in the budgets as minor discrepencies.15 It is 
noteworthy that some of the items that are regarded by the concept’s 
proponents as clearly constituting expenditures are not so regarded by 
some other commentators. For example, Professors Chirelstein and 
Zelenak state that all personal deductions, such as charitable contribu-
tions and medical expenses, are clearly tax expenditures.16 On the other 
hand, a number of commentators have concluded that some personal 
deductions are consistent with a normal tax system.17 That conflict of 
 13. The commentary in the budget promulgated by the Staff of the Joint Committee states 
that any depreciation provision that allows for a deduction in excess of what would be permitted 
under straight-line recovery using the recovery periods set forth in the alternative depreciation 
system established in I.R.C. § 168(g) will be treated as a tax expenditure. STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 6. The commentary indicates that economic depreciation 
is deemed to be the model. Economic depreciation is explained infra Part III.A. 
 14. See, e.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 206 (12th ed. 2012). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.; see also Gregg D. Polsky, Rationally Cutting Tax Expenditures, 50 U. LOUISVILLE 
L. REV. 643 (2012) (arguing that charitable deductions, certain retirement accounts, child tax 
credits, and the home mortgage interest deduction are all types of tax expenditures). 
 17. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. 
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views illustrates that even if the premise of the expenditure concept 
were correct, the classification of many such tax items as expenditures   
is controversial. 
 To quarrel with the inclusion of some of the items in the budgets may 
not be sufficient to justify abandoning the expenditure concept. While 
such commentary casts doubt on the reliability of parts of the budgets, it 
leaves open the question of whether the concept itself is viable. The 
more items that are questioned, the greater the skepticism over the   
reliability of the budgets; but the flaw in the concept is more fundamen-
tal than the difficulty encountered in identifying those items that        
are expenditures. 
 It is the thesis of this Essay that the controversial aspect of some of 
the items listed in the budgets is a symptom of the fact that the underly-
ing premise of the expenditure concept is unsound. The failure of the 
expenditure concept is not merely that many of the inclusions in the 
budget are questionable. Rather, its failure lies in the fact that the en-
tire concept is based on an erroneous view of the income tax system. It is 
not sufficient to correct individual items of the budget; the entire tax 
expenditure concept should be discarded. I discuss below the view of the 
tax system on which the expenditure concept is based and describe a 
different view of the tax system that more accurately comports with how 
tax law actually operates and should operate. 
 The tax expenditure concept rests on the view that an ideal or normal 
tax system exists. Tax provisions are then compared to that ideal or 
normal system to see if they conform or not. The ideal system is usually 
described as one that assesses taxes on some modified version of the 
Haig-Simons definition of income—i.e., that income is equal to the sum 
of a person’s accumulation of wealth and the market value of that per-
son’s personal consumption during a specified period.18 Whatever may be 
said about that definition as an ideal, it does not take into account the 
administrative practicalities of overseeing an income tax system for mil-
lions of people engaged in a great variety of economic activities. The var-
ious tax expenditure budgets, however, do exclude provisions that serve 
administrative functions.19   
L. REV. 309 (1972); Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions – A Tax “Ideal” or Just Another 
“Deal”?, 2002 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 1; Joel S. Newman, Commentary, Of Taxes and Other 
Casualties, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 941 (1983); William J. Turnier, Personal Deductions and Tax 
Reform: The High Road and the Low Road, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1703 (1986). 
 18. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).  Treasury’s tax budget expressly adopts the Haig-Simons 
definition as its model. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 242. 
 19. The Staff of the Joint Committee’s budget expressely states that it excludes provisions 
that serve administrative feasability. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 5. 
Treasury’s budget excludes some items because of their administrative function. For example, it 
excludes unrealized income from its budget. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 242. 
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 The two governmental budgets apply different standards for deter-
mining the baseline against which tax items are measured.20 The draft-
ers of one budget create what they consider to be an ideal system for 
their baseline, and the drafters of the other budget determine what 
principles they consider to be normal in the current tax system and then 
characterize some of the current tax provisions as out of place with 
those principles and, therefore, as tax expenditures.21 However, both 
budgets recognize that some basic tax principles are appropriate and do 
not create an expenditure. For example, the doctrine of realization is 
treated as a normal and appropriate part of a tax system, and so adher-
ence to that doctrine does not create a tax expenditure for either budg-
et.22 For accounting purposes, the Joint Committee’s budget treats the 
accrual method as normal except where it is not feasible to use it.23 The 
budgets acknowledge that administrative convenience is a proper goal of 
a tax system, and that is why they generally accept the realization doc-
trine.24 In recognition of the importance of administrative convenience to 
the operation of a tax system, the budgets accept a number of other tax 
principles, including the measuring of gain without regard to the effect 
of inflation.25 The Joint Committee’s budget does not treat the failure to 
tax the imputed income from one’s own services or from home ownership 
as a tax expenditure because the Committee considers them to be ex-
cluded from income out of administrative necessity.26  
 The tax expenditure system is based on a binary view of tax provi-
sions. They either conform to normal principles or they do not. There are 
no degrees of compliance; every tax provision is either black or white. 
That is an inaccurate picture of how a tax system is actually structured 
and how it should be structured. 
 The proponents of the tax expenditure concept are correct in assert-
ing that there is a core of provisions that clearly are part of the struc-
ture of an income tax system. The deduction of the expenses of produc-
ing income is a necessary part of a tax system if one seeks to tax net in-
 20. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 1, 20-22. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 5; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 241-42. In a recent article, Pro-
fessor Calvin Johnson proposes a different baseline for tax expenditures that would include the 
failure to tax unrealized appreciation as a tax expenditure. See Calvin H. Johnson, Measure Tax 
Expenditures by Internal Rate of Return, 137 TAX NOTES 273 (2013). If the tax expenditure con-
cept were to adopt all of Professor Johnson’s recommendations, the budget would have very 
little significance because relatively few tax provisions would be omitted.  
 23. STAFF OF JOINT  COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 7. 
 24. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 25. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 7; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
supra note 3, at 257.   
 26. Id. at 5. However, Treasury’s budget does classify some imputed income as a tax 
expenditure. Id. at 5 n.11.  
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come as contrasted to gross receipts.27 The number of provisions that fit 
within that core may be fewer than some imagine, but there is no doubt 
that there is a core of such provisions. However, it is an error to treat 
tax provisions as either within that core or outside of it. In reality, most 
provisions lie on a continuum of varying distances from that core. For 
example, the expenses of daycare for an infant may be necessary for the 
parent to work and earn income, but the personal elements of having a 
child cause that expense to lie further from the core than the expenses of 
paying an employee to sell the taxpayer’s products. Medical expenses 
may be an appropriate deduction,28 but they are further from the core 
than are ordinary business expenses. One of the flaws of the tax expendi-
ture concept is that it ignores the proximity of a provision to the core. 
 Tax law does not operate in a vacuum. Tax laws affect behavior and 
can have societal and economic consequences that may be desirable or 
may be undesirable. For example, the failure to tax imputed income may 
influence one spouse to stay home to care for a child rather than to earn 
taxable wages and pay someone else to care for the child. The tax law 
will have an influence on the parent’s decision. The likelihood of the tax 
system skewing that decision is enhanced by the fact that the secondary 
spouse’s wages may be taxed at a higher rate because of the income 
earned by the other spouse. If no deduction is allowed for child care, the 
tax law will create an incentive for one spouse to not be employed. The 
decision for one spouse to stay home and care for the child may be re-
garded as desirable or undesirable depending upon one’s views on both 
societal and economic issues. If it were concluded that that decision 
should be made by the parents, insulated from any outside influence by 
the government, the tax law’s influence could be neutralized by provid-
ing a tax deduction for the expense of child care. The parent’s decision 
could then be made independently of tax considerations. Instead of 
providing a deduction, current tax law gives a tax credit for such ex-
penses.29 That works less efficiently than would a deduction, but it 
serves the same function. 
 The child care example is one where a tax provision could be adopted 
to prevent another tax position (the failure to tax imputed income) from 
influencing behavior when it is determined that such influence is unde-
sirable. It seems to me that a provision designed to negate a negative 
influence of the tax law should not be regarded as a tax expenditure 
 27. There are good reasons not to base a tax system on gross receipts. Such a tax would 
impose greater taxes on businesses with high costs than on those with low costs. That would 
violate the doctrine of horizontal and vertical equity. 
 28. To the contrary, as previously noted, there are those who conclude that medical 
expenses should not be deductible. The issue is controversial. See supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. 
 29. I.R.C. § 21(a)(1), (b)(2)(a). 
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even if the provision is deemed to differ from an ideal tax. Provisions of 
that nature should be classified differently.  
 In contrast to neutralizing tax influences, a tax provision could be 
adopted in order to induce or deter certain behavior. Some provisions 
clearly were designed to further a non-tax objective. For example, 
providing tax benefits for the purchase of anti-pollution devices has pro-
grammatic goals. The tax expenditure proponents would claim that a 
tax provision that is designed to induce behavior is a subsidy and should 
be characterized as an expenditure.30 That view is too simplistic. 
 As noted above, relatively few tax provisions fit within the core of 
measuring and taxing net income. Instead, most lie on a continuum in 
which some are close to that core and some are far from it. Legislators 
take into account the effect that a proposed tax provision will have on 
behavior and consider whether that behavior will have societal or eco-
nomic consequences that are desirable or undesirable. It would be fool-
ish to ignore the influence of taxation on the economy and on societal 
decisions and simply to allow good and bad consequences to occur in any 
way they happen to arise. That is not what occurs.  
 The considerations that go into the adoption of tax provisions are 
multifaceted. The proximity of the provision to the core of a tax system 
is one factor, but only one factor. The further a provision is from the 
core, the greater the policy considerations must be to justify its reten-
tion. The closer the provision is to the core, the less relative weight that 
is accorded to policy considerations. However, policy considerations are 
never entirely absent from the equation. Even a core provision may be 
removed from the tax law because of the prominence of adverse policy 
considerations. For example, a deduction for an expense that directly 
produces income is a core provision. But, there are circumstances where 
no deduction is allowed for such expenses because they contravene non-
tax policies. One such exception is for illegal expenses, which are denied 
deductibility by I.R.C. § 162(c). While, for several reasons, I think that § 
162(c) is a bad provision, its legislative purpose obviously rests on non-
tax considerations. A fine that arises out of an activity conducted in op-
erating a business is nondeductible because of I.R.C. § 162(f). Another 
example is unreimbursed employee business expenses, which are treat-
ed as miscellaneous itemized deductions and so are subjected to limita-
tions on their deductibility31 or even disallowed entirely if the AMT ap-
plies.32 There is no aspect of accurate income measurement that would 
 30. The thesis of the tax expenditure concept is that tax provisions that are designed to 
implement a program, as contrasted to a measurement of net income, are equivalent to a direct 
expenditure of governent funds and should be accorded the same treatment. See STAFF OF 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 2; STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX 
EXPENDITURES 1 (1985). 
 31. Id. §§ 67-68.    
 32. Id. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (disallowing a deduction for miscellaneous itemized deductions in 
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justify that treatment of business expenses, the full deductibility of 
which is clearly within the core of proper tax provisions. 
 This picture of taxation explains one of the reasons why tax provi-
sions need to be altered from time to time. The consequences of a provi-
sion can change as societal and economic conditions change. The values 
that society holds can change so that consequences that once were 
thought desirable are now viewed as undesirable, or vice versa.  
 There is another fundamental flaw in the tax expenditure concept. 
Not only does it posit that there is a pure income tax system, it is based 
on the assumption that the current tax law is designed generally to con-
form to that system so that variances from it can be seen as departures 
that often represent disguised expenditures.33 To the contrary, the cur-
rent system is not designed to be purely a taxation of net income nor did 
its drafters aspire to that exclusive goal. The current system is far more 
pragmatic. It is designed to be a combination of taxation of income and 
consumption.34 In their excellent casebook, Professors Bankman, Shavi-
ro, and Stark state, “it is often said that our system is as much a con-
sumption tax as an income tax, or more precisely some sort of impure 
hybrid of the two.”35 More broadly, the tax system can be seen as a hy-
brid of income tax and consumption tax systems infused with a pragma-
tism that takes into account various policies and values. 
 The pragmatic approach that Congress has adopted in enacting the 
tax law is illustrated in Subchapter K, which contains the principal pro-
visions dealing with the taxation of partnerships and partners.36 There 
are two very different views of the nature of a partnership. It can be 
viewed as a separate entity distinct from its partners. Alternatively, it 
can be regarded as a mere convenient representative of the aggregate of 
interests of the partners. The exclusive adoption of either view would 
result in a quite different tax system from the one that would be applied 
if the other view were taken. Congress chose not to adopt either view 
determining the alternative minimum taxable income of an individual); see also id. § 67(b) 
(outlining what constitutes a “miscellaneous itemized deduction”). 
 33. The only plausible justification for characterizing some tax provisions as falling 
outside of pure income measurement is that the legislative purpose for having an income tax 
system is to measure and tax income, such that any actual tax provisions that fail to measure 
income accurately and that further a non-tax policy objective constitute a utilization of the tax 
system to finance a program that the legislature desires. 
 34. For example, the tax law does not apply to some significant accessions to wealth such 
as imputed income and unrealized appreciation of the value of assets, and the tax law’s view of 
consumption appears to be different from the one contemplated in the Haig-Simons definition. 
For example, commentators have questioned whether the deduction for medical expenses and 
charitable contributions conflict with Haig-Simons because they should be treated as 
consumption expenses. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 35. JOSEPH BANKMAN, DANIEL N. SHAVIRO & KIRK J. STARK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
14 (16th ed. 2012). 
 36. LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K 1 (4th 
ed. 2010). 
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exclusively. Instead, Congress adopted a hybrid view that treats a part-
nership as a separate entity for some purposes and as an aggregate of 
interests for others.37 Rather than adhering to a fixed model, Congress 
chose a more flexible and nuanced approach. When the tax law operated 
better by treating the partnership as an entity, Congress did so; and 
when the tax law operated better by treating the partnership as an ag-
gregate of the partners’ interests, it did so.  
 The pragmatism of the tax system is reflected throughout the Code. 
Another example is the treatment of spouses. For some purposes, they 
are treated as two separate individuals.38 For other purposes, they are 
treated as a single unit.39 Repeatedly, Congress shows that it is not seek-
ing to adopt some idealized system, but rather seeks to have a system 
that carries out its policies and goals. The discussion in Part III.B of this 
Essay notes that Congress has shown that same pragmatism in its 
treatment of depreciation. In some circumstances, Congress has chosen 
to ignore unrealized appreciation in measuring the amount of an asset’s 
depreciation.40 In other circumstances, it has disallowed any deprecia-
tion deductions because it has taken unrealized appreciation into ac-
count.41 In other words, in some circumstances, Congress has adhered to 
the realization doctrine in determining depreciation, and in other cir-
cumstances it has rejected the realization doctrine.  
 Given the hybrid and pragmatic nature of the country’s income tax 
system, it is folly to speak of provisions departing from some fixed, ideal 
view of income. Such so-called departures can be as much a proper part 
of the system as those that are seen as core provisions. There are nu-
merous factors to be considered in determining whether any tax provi-
sion should be retained, but its relationship to some ideal tax system is 
not one of them. 
 Once it is accepted that the tax law does not seek to adhere to a sin-
gle view of taxation, it seems clear that any purported departures from 
an ideal system cannot be characterized as impure. A provision that 
does not conform to an imagined ideal tax system could be a provision 
that complements other provisions that do not conform. Once a variance 
 37. See, e.g., KAREN C. BURKE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERS AND 
PARTNERSHIPS 1-2 (4th ed. 2013). 
 38. For example, spouses are not required to file a joint income tax return under I.R.C. 
§ 6013, but they can each file separately, reporting his or her own income and deductions. 
 39. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i) (treating a taxpayer as owning stock owned by the 
taxpayer’s spouse); id. § 469(h)(5) (treating the participation of a taxpayer’s spouse as 
participation of the taxpayer). 
 40. As noted in Part III.B infra, the allowance of accelerated depreciation effectively 
ignores the unrealized appreciation in the remaining life of the asset. 
 41. No depreciation is allowable for a non-wasting asset (such as land) because the 
appreciation of the value of the remaining life of the asset offsets the value that was exhausted 
in the year in which the asset was used. 
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from a system has been adopted, there can be good reasons not to follow 
that system when adopting other provisions. 
 The proponents of the tax expenditure concept do not contend that 
the items listed in the budgets necessarily should be repealed or 
changed. They contend that since the items do not conform to estab-
lished tax principles, each should be repealed unless a convincing case 
can be made for its retention on the basis of serving some valuable socie-
tal or economic purpose whose benefit justifies the amount of revenue 
that is lost because of that provision.42 In other words, because of their 
equivalence to a direct expenditure, they should meet the same process 
of review that is applied to determine whether to continue making a  
direct expenditure.43 
 By singling out some tax provisions because they serve non-tax policy 
functions, the concept obscures the fact that non-tax policy considera-
tions have a role in the question of the adoption or retention of virtually 
all tax provisions.44 The inclusion of some items on the list suggests that 
the items that are not on the list are free of policy considerations. Also, 
by placing all so-called tax expenditures in a single category of non-
neutral, the concept ignores the different status of provisions that lie on 
different points of the continuum. Since the adoption or retention of vir-
tually all tax provisions is influenced by non-tax considerations, the se-
lection of some such provisions to be designated as having a program-
matic function is misleading because it suggests those provisions are 
significantly different from the many other provisions that also serve a 
programmatic function.  
 The expenditure concept serves more of a political purpose than it 
does provide any useful information. By classifying some provisions as 
tax expenditures, it suggests that they do not belong in the tax system 
and makes them prominent targets for repeal whenever Congress needs 
to increase revenue.45 This labeling could alter the debate on listed items 
by marking them with a scarlet letter. Moreover, the question of where 
the items belong on the continuum, which should be a factor, might be 
 42. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 30, at 26-27. 
 43. As previously noted, some authors have questioned the extent to which direct 
expenditures are scrutinized. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 1, at 1320. 
 44. As previously noted, even core provisions, such as business expenses, are subject to 
non-tax considerations. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. In that case, as 
contrasted to inducing the adoption of a provision, the presence of undesirable non-tax 
consequences can lead to eliminating or limiting the item. 
 45. Despite the promulgation of tax expenditure budgets, the number of items that are 
classified as expenditures has continued to grow. Some have concluded, therefore, that the tax 
expenditure budgets have been ineffective. Indeed, Professor Zelinsky contends that the 
budgets have been counterproductive and have actually stimulated the increase in tax 
expenditures. Zelinsky, supra note 1, at 1317. While that seems an unlikely consequence and 
other explanations are available, I make a different point in this Essay. My thesis is that the 
expenditure concept is based on a false premise and should be discarded regardless of its 
efficacy. 
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overlooked. The following discussion of accelerated depreciation provides 
an example of a designated expenditure provision that can be seen to be 
within the core itself. The characterization of accelerated depreciation as 
an expenditure reflects the rigidity of the expenditure concept and its 
failure to reflect the flexibility of the tax system, which accommodates a 
variety of approaches for the determination of income. 
III.   DEPRECIATION DEDUCTIONS 
 The cost of acquiring an asset that will be used in a trade or business 
or for the production of income is deductible.46 However, if the asset is to 
be used by the taxpayer for more than one year, the entire cost generally 
cannot be deducted currently, but instead it must be capitalized.47 The 
capitalized cost can be allocated among the years of the asset’s useful 
life, and a portion of the cost can be deducted in each year.48 Certain 
types of amortization of cost are referred to as depreciation.49 If an ali-
quot amount is allocated equally to each year of the recovery period, the 
depreciation is referred to as “straight-line” depreciation.50 Some meth-
ods of depreciation allocate a greater amount of cost to the earlier years 
of the recovery period than to the later years. Those types are called “ac-
celerated depreciation.” The most commonly used accelerated deprecia-
tion method authorized by the Code is the “declining balance method.”51 
 While there is little dispute as to the appropriateness of allowing de-
preciation deductions, there are issues as to the methods of depreciation 
that should be available and as to the choice of a recovery period. In 
general, the tax expenditure budgets treat accelerated methods as ex-
penditures to the extent that the amount of deduction in a year exceeds 
what would be allowed under either straight-line or economic deprecia-
tion.52 The source of the view that accelerated depreciation is excessive 
is an approach to depreciation called “economic depreciation” or “sink-
ing-fund depreciation.” 
 46. I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 212(1). 
 47. Id. § 263; see Indopco v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). The one-year standard is a 
rule of thumb that has been adopted by the Service. See Rev. Rul. 73-357, 1973-2 C.B. 40; Rev. 
Rul. 69-560, 1969-2 C.B. 25. 
 48. I.R.C. §§ 167-168. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-1(a). 
 51. I.R.C. § 168(b). 
 52. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 6; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
supra note 3, at 258 (utilizing economic depreciation, a decelerated method, as the normal tax 
baseline). 
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A.   Economic Depreciation 
 Economic depreciation is based on the premise that the correct 
amount of depreciation allowable for a year is the amount by which the 
asset declined in value by the end of the year.53 It is not based on the 
actual decline in the asset’s value, which would require appraisals to be 
made. Rather, it is based on the decline that occurs because of the pas-
sage of time without regard to changes that may have taken place in 
market conditions. Apart from the administrative difficulty in measur-
ing market changes, tax law has firmly established that changes in mar-
ket value do not affect the amount of depreciation that is allowable.54 
 Economic depreciation concludes (quite reasonably) that the value of 
an asset is the sum of the present values of the income stream that it is 
assumed the asset will produce. The calculation of economic depreciation 
is illustrated in an example in the treatise on federal income taxation 
that is co-authored by Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak.55 I will use 
their example since it provides such a clear explanation of that approach 
to depreciation. 
 In that illustration, a machine is purchased for $4000 to be used in a 
business. The machine is expected to last for 5 years and to produce (af-
ter maintenance expenses) income of $1200 each year. While it is unre-
alistic to assume an equal amount of income production each year, that 
assumption makes the calculations easier. I will also assume, unrealisti-
cally, that the entire $1200 is received at the end of each year, rather 
than being earned throughout the year.  
 To calculate the value of each year’s income stream to a purchaser, 
the market will discount the $1200 for that year by a figure that repre-
sents the rate of income that the market deems appropriate for the risk 
involved in purchasing the machine. The discount rate that is used to 
establish the price of an asset is set by the market. Since the purchaser 
paid $4000 for a machine that will produce $6000 over a 5-year period, 
the discount rate was about 15%.  
 The value of the machine will decrease by the end of each year since 
the remaining life of the machine will be one year less. But, simultane-
ously, the value of the remaining years of use will increase because they 
are one year nearer to occurring. The latter increase in value will offset 
some of the reduction in value caused by the expiration of one year’s life. 
Chirelstein and Zelenak illustrate this effect by setting forth the         
following schedule:56 
 53. CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 14, at 187. 
 54. Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 277 (1966). 
 55. CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 14, at 187-88. 
 56. Id. at 188. 
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 As you can see from that schedule, the decline in value of the ma-
chine at the end of Year 1 was $573. In the next year, the machine de-
clined in value by $687. The decline in value was larger in each subse-
quent year until the fifth year when the decline was $1045. If deprecia-
tion deductions were to follow that schedule, there would be only $573 of 
depreciation in the first year and increasing amounts each year until the 
last year would have $1045 of depreciation. Instead of straight line or 
accelerated depreciation, there would be decelerated depreciation. In a 
nutshell, that is economic or sinking-fund depreciation. 
 Because economic or sinking-fund depreciation is based on several 
unrealistic assumptions, no one advocates the adoption of that system. 
Indeed, Chirelstein and Zelenak themselves acknowledge that the as-
sumptions are unrealistic for the depreciation of tangible assets, and 
they note that if more realistic assumptions were made, “the proper de-
preciation method would be less decelerated than sinking fund, or possi-
bly even straight-line or accelerated.”57 While the tax expenditure budg-
et proposed by the Joint Committee on Taxation considers economic de-
preciation to be the model, they treat straight-line depreciation as the 
normal baseline for their budget.58 
B.   Proper Method of Depreciation 
 Let us ignore the unrealistic assumptions that go into economic de-
preciation and focus on whether it is the only proper view of deprecia-
tion when accepting those assumptions.  
 Referring to the schedule above for the machine that was purchased 
for $4000, we can see that of the $4000 that the purchaser paid for the 
machine, $1045 of it was attributable to the income he expected to earn 
in the first year of using the machine. If he paid $1045 for the first 
 57. Id. at 189. 
 58. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 6. 
 Present  
Value 
of  
Investment 
Present Value of Remaining Payments 
Annual 
Loss 
in  
Present 
Value 
  1 2 3 4 5  
Start Year 1 $4000 $1045 $905 $790 $687 $573  
End Year 1 $3427  $1045 $905 $790 $687 $573 
End Year 2 $2740   $1045 $905 $790 $687 
End Year 3 $1950    $1045 $905 $790 
End Year 4 $1045     $1045 $905 
End Year 5 $0      $1045 
 Total $4000 
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year’s use of the machine, why doesn’t economic depreciation allow him 
to deduct that amount for the use of the machine in that year? Why does 
economic depreciation allow him to deduct only $573? The answer is 
that while he used up the first year of the machine’s life for which he 
paid $1045, the value of the remaining four years of the machine’s life 
increased due to the fact that they are all one year closer in time to be-
ing earned. So, we can see that economic depreciation is based on offset-
ting the exhaustion of the $1045 paid for the first year’s use of the ma-
chine by the increase in value of the remaining life of the machine due to 
the passage of time. 
 The increase in the value of the remaining life of the machine is un-
realized appreciation. The doctrine of realization is a basic element of 
the federal income tax system, and the tax expenditure budgets do not 
treat the application of that doctrine as creating an expenditure.59 If the 
increase in value of the remaining life were not taken into account in 
determining depreciation because of the realization doctrine, the ma-
chine would be depreciated on an accelerated method. The first year’s 
depreciation would be $1040, the second year’s would be $905, and so on, 
until the fifth year’s depreciation would be $573.  
 Does that accelerated method violate normal principles of federal in-
come taxation? It is the thesis of this Essay that it does not. It rests on 
an application of the realization doctrine that is widely used in the fed-
eral income tax system and clearly is part of the normal tax system. 
 As previously noted, it is not my position that accelerated deprecia-
tion is the only permissible method under normal taxation rules. While 
the realization doctrine is generally applied in the tax system, there are 
a few circumstances when Congress has chosen not to apply it.60 If Con-
gress chose not to take the unrealized appreciation of the remaining life 
of an asset into account when determining depreciation deductions, that 
would not violate any neutral principles of taxation. Similarly, if Con-
gress chose to calculate depreciation by offsetting the appreciation of the 
remaining life of an asset against the amount paid for one year’s use, 
even though that would not comport with the realization doctrine, that 
treatment also would be consistent with normal tax principles. While 
the realization doctrine is a normal part of tax law, there is no require-
ment that it be used. Ignoring the realization doctrine is just as “normal” 
as following it. There is no “correct” method; either one is permissible. 
 Indeed, Congress has rejected the realization doctrine for purposes of 
determining depreciation in certain circumstances. Generally, no depre-
ciation deduction is allowable for assets that are not subject to wear and 
 59. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 60. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 336, 1272 (treating “debt instruments having original issue 
discount[s]” and property acquired during corporate liquidation as a gain/loss of income). 
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tear.61 Consequently, no depreciation deduction is allowable for land and 
for stocks. While such assets do not deteriorate due to wear and tear, 
the present value of each year’s income declines the further the years 
are from the present. At some point in time, the present value of the re-
maining years of income will be de minimis. Why then is no depreciation 
allowable for such assets? The apparent answer is that in those cases, 
Congress has chosen to reject the realization doctrine and to take into 
account the appreciation in value of the remaining life of those assets. 
Once again, Congress has displayed its pragmatism by refusing to be 
restricted to a single approach.62 
C.   Illustration of a Flaw in the Tax Expenditure Concept 
 The tax expenditure budgets’ treatment of accelerated depreciation 
illustrates the basic flaw in that concept. The budgets rest on the notion 
that there is a single correct or perfect system of federal income taxation 
that has no relationship to policy considerations. The error in that view 
is much more than the great difficulty that exists in determining just 
what constitutes a perfect system. The error is to assume that such a 
system exists and that it would be desirable to adopt it. The budget’s 
rigid approach to depreciation illustrates how wrong it is to hold that 
there is a single correct approach to measuring income. The tax law is 
and should be far more flexible and pragmatic than that. It should ac-
commodate the needs of the time. Policy considerations are a normal 
part of the tax system and should not be classified as aberrations.  
 If accelerated depreciation is more desirable at one point in time, it 
should be employed. If it is not desirable at another point in time, it 
should be abandoned. There is no reason to skew that decision by cate-
gorizing one of the choices as being inconsistent with normal tax princi-
ples. Accelerated depreciation is consistent with normal tax principles, 
and the decision whether to retain or repeal it should not be influenced 
by a false characterization that it is not. 
 61. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2. 
 62. In a recent article, Professor Calvin Johnson contends that accelerated depreciation 
does not comport with a new baseline that he urges should be adopted in determining tax 
expenditures in lieu of the baselines that are used currently. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 
273-74. In essence, his contention is that a policy analysis of depreciation would reject 
accelerated depreciation. As noted above, I do not contend that accelerated depreciation should 
be adopted; I merely contend that its adoption does not contravene normal current tax 
principles. Professor Johnson’s position that economic policy supports eliminating accelerated 
depreciation rests on a single consideration (on the merits of which I express no opinion in this 
Essay) and ignores some of the other factors that might properly be taken into account. For 
example, the likely effect of inflation on measuring depreciation might be considered. The fact 
that the value of many personal property items does decline more in the earlier years of the 
asset’s use might be weighed. In any event, it is not my intention to take a side on the question 
of whether accelerated depreciation is desirable as a matter of policy. I leave that question for 
others to resolve, but I suspect that answers will differ at different points in time depending 
upon the needs of that period. 
                                                                                                                  
158  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:143 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 I maintain that the tax expenditure concept is grounded on a basic 
error in its view of the income tax system. There is no “perfect” or “ideal” 
tax system. The tax system is not divorced from every political, societal, 
and economic condition that exists, nor is it independent of the values 
that society holds at given points in time. The tax expenditure concept 
views the ideal tax system as one that is insulated from non-tax factors 
rather than being a part of and responsive to them. It is wrong to treat 
tax as isolated from everything else. The adoption of that view can dis-
tort the proper consideration of the passage or repeal of tax provisions. 
 The advocates of the tax expenditure concept recognize that non-tax 
policies can properly induce Congress to adopt specific tax provisions. 
Their contention is that such provisions should be scrutinized as they 
would if they were direct expenditures. However, by characterizing some 
provisions as inconsistent with neutral tax principles, they attempt to 
make it more difficult to defend the listed items. More importantly, by 
adopting a binary approach in characterizing provisions as either within 
normal tax principles or outside of them, the concept fails to take into 
account the greater variety that exists in a properly structured tax sys-
tem. Provisions that are outside of the core of proper tax provisions are 
not all distanced from that core to the same extent. Some provisions lie 
closer to the core than others, and some are far removed from it. The 
expenditure concept obscures that fact and describes the tax world       
as containing only two categories—those within the system and those 
outside of it. 
 It has been pointed out that while the tax expenditure concept has 
been widely accepted, it has been notoriously ineffective in changing the 
tax law.63 While there has been some speculation as to why that is so, 
the most obvious reason seems to have been ignored. The likely reason 
that the concept has not had a greater impact on tax legislation is that 
even though people purport to approve of the concept, they intuitively 
realize that it is flawed and should not have any influence. 
 Some have suggested that even if the tax expenditure concept is 
flawed, it would be useful to have a list of tax items that might be scru-
tinized by Congress when it seems appropriate to do so. I have no quar-
rel with the promulgation of such a list. My quarrel is with the charac-
terization of certain tax items as “impure” because they do not comport 
with a supposed ideal tax system. It is the stigmatization of certain tax 
items that is the source of the mischief with which I find fault. 
 
 
 63. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 1, at 1317 (explaining how “tax expenditure budgets . . . 
have not curbed tax expenditures, as the proponents of those budgets promised”). 
                                                                                                                  
